January 28, 2008
Yemen's Relationship with its Jihaddis
The New York Times has quite an accurate article on Yemen today: Yemen's Deals With Jihadists Unsettle the U.S. The article highlights several important aspects of the relationship between the Yemen government and al-Qaeda militants, hopefully already familiar to Jawa readers.
The religious dialog program is "a raw deal": no jihad in Yemen and you are left alone. The deal leaves the jihaddists free to plan and facilitate other jihaddist activity abroad. Jihaddists released from prison get money, cars and government jobs (jihaddis in ties). Some become government informants. Escaped prisoners who surrender are usually released. Training fighters to go to Iraq (and fighting in Iraq) is not against Yemeni law. "Yemen’s uneasy partnership with jihadists dates back to the late 1980s," check. They were used as an internal paramilitary in 1994, check. President Saleh's ties to radical Islamists persist today, check.
The best line in the article addresses a critical point: "They also say the Yemeni government caters too much to radical Islamist figures to improve its political standing, nourishing a culture that could ultimately breed more violence." I normally refer to it as the state sponsored spread of Takfirism, but nourishing an extremist culture works also.
Some western analysts agree with this: “The strategy is fighting terrorism, but we need space to use our own tactics, and our friends must understand us,” said Rashad Muhammad al-Alimi, Yemen’s interior minister. These analysts argue that securing Saleh's reign in power will enable him to more vigorously pursue the US counter-terror agenda. One even advanced the idea that the US should graciously accept the fact that convicted USS Cole bombing mastermind, Jamal al-Badawi, if not currently free, will be soon. However, the threat posed to the US by these hardened fanatics, who already have blood on their teeth, should not be underestimated nor should their promises of good behavior be taken on faith.
As this article notes, the extremists are an important power base for Saleh. As long as he is in power, the internal social empowerment of the extremist ideology will continue as will the export and facilitation of jihaddists abroad. And it will sooner or later turn around and bite Saleh. (If it does not bite the US first, more than it has done already.) The foundation of the Salafi ideology is obedience to a Muslim ruler regardless of his competence as an administrator. As the takfiri ideology spreads, Saleh becomes increasingly vulnerable to it and being branded an apostate, which apparently a few younger jihaddis have done.
"Some of these younger men have fought in Iraq, and they refuse all dialogue, seeing Yemen’s government as illegitimate. They appear to have been responsible for the suicide bombing in Marib Province last July in which eight Spanish tourists were killed, and two other suicide attacks on oil installations in 2006. Recently, there have been warnings of more attacks in Yemen on Islamist Web sites. "
I am unclear on who was responsible for the thwarted attacks in 2006, the suicide bombing of tourists last summer and the recent attack in Hadramout, but attributing the resurgence of terror activity to the younger generation seems to be the new "in" analysis and is certainly logical based on available information.
