July 23, 2006

Strafor : Hizb'Allah's Motivations

From Stratfor:

Hezbollah's strategy will be to tie down the Israelis as long as possible first in the area south of the Litani River and then north in the Bekaa. It can, and will, continue to rocket Haifa from further north. It will inflict casualties and draw the Israelis further north. At a certain point Hezbollah will do what the Taliban and Saddam Hussein did: It will suddenly abandon the conventional fight, going to ground, and then re-emerge as a guerrilla group, inflicting casualties on the Israelis as the Sunnis do on the Americans, wearing them down.

Israel's strategy, as we have seen, will be to destroy Hezbollah's infrastructure but not occupy any territory. In other words, invade, smash and leave, carrying out follow-on attacks as needed. Hezbollah's goal will be to create military problems that force Israel to maintain a presence for an extended period of time, so that its follow-on strategy can be made to work. This will be what determines the outcome of the war. Hezbollah will try to keep Israel from disengaging. Israel will try to disengage.

Hezbollah sees the war in these stages:

1. Rocket attacks to force and Israeli response.

2. An extended period of conventional combat to impose substantial losses on the Israelis, and establish Hezbollah capabilities to both Israel and the Arab and Islamic worlds. This will involve using fairly sophisticated weaponry and will go on as long as Hezbollah can extend it.

3. Hezbollah's abandonment of conventional warfare for a prepared insurgency program.

What Hezbollah wants is political power in Lebanon and among the Palestinians, and freedom for action within the context of Syrian-Iranian relations. This war will cost it dearly, but it has been preparing for this for a generation. Some of the old guard may not have the stomach for this, but it was either this or be pushed aside by the younger bloods. Syria wanted to see this happen. Iran wanted to see this happen. Iran risks nothing. Syria risks little since Israel is terrified of the successor regime to the Assads. So long as Syria limits resupply and does not intervene, Israel must leave Damascus out.

Looked at from Hezbollah's point of view, taking the fight to the Israelis is something that has not happened in quite a while. Hezbollah's hitting of Haifa gives it the position it has sought for a generation. If it can avoid utter calamity, it will have won -- if not by defeating Israel, then by putting itself first among the anti-Israeli forces. What Hezbollah wants in Israel is much less clear and important than what it opposes. It opposes Israel and is the most effective force fighting it.

Are both sides just going in for an extended guerilla slugfest? If so, Israel would seem to be at a distinct disadvantage, given the realities of the modern media and the ample historical evidence that democracies have a weak stomach for the messy brutality of extended guerilla warfare.

Ehud Olmert and the other Israeli leaders surrounding him are both military people and experienced politicians. I think we can presume they know all of the above and have factored all of it into Israel's strategy. It seems to me that they must have some reason to think this game, though played in Hizb'Allah's playground, can be played according to Israel's game plan rather than Hizb'Allah's. They must have reason to think that they know things that Hizb'Allah doesn't. We can only conjecture as to what those "things" might be. Hizb'Allah operatives had to know they were being watched as they prepared for this war, but I'll wager they were being watched more closely than they realized. My guess is that Israel knows quite a bit more about the logistical details of Hizb'Allah's operations in Lebanon than Hizb'Allah ever imagined, and that the IDF is currently using that information to defang Hizb'Allah somewhat more effectively than Hizb'Allah had planned for.